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Allyson M Pollock Health Policy and Health
Services Research Unit, School of Public Policy, University College
London, London WC1H 9EZ
allyson.pollock{at}ucl.ac.uk
The use of private finance in primary care premises has
seen the entry of commercial property developers and for-profit
healthcare companies, paralleling developments in the NHS hospital
sector.1 As funding for capital investment in the NHS has
become more complex, with the requirement that public-private
partnerships generate a mixture of state and commercial revenues, the
risks and costs of investment make general practitioners' ownership of
premises increasingly unlikely.1 At the same time, the
government's NHS Plan expects a rapid move of general practitioners
into a salaried service, the end of independent contractor status, and an increasing role for the private sector.2 These changes
raise questions about how government policy will affect the control of clinical decision making in managing NHS budgets and the core principles of the NHS. In this article I examine these issues from the
perspective of the duties imposed by the NHS Plan on primary care
trusts, which are the new NHS structures for health and social care,
and show how the Health and Social Care Bill 2000 could move the United
Kingdom towards a US-style health care system.
The Health Act 1999 introduced primary care groups and
primary care trusts. Primary care groups and trusts3 hold
unified, cash limited budgets to pay for their patients' use of
hospital and community health services, general medical services, and
prescribing.4 The government intends that primary care
trusts will hold around 70% of the entire NHS budget. There are
currently 434 primary care groups and 40 first wave primary care trusts
in England; a further 124 primary care groups are to become trusts in
April 2001.5
The Health and Social Care Bill also provides for primary care trusts
to become care trusts holding social care budgets under delegated
authority from local authorities. Although this has been hailed as a
means of integrating health and social care budgets, it means that for
the first time a NHS body in England and Wales will have a mechanism
and the powers to charge for personal care and hotel costs. This is
because health care is funded from central taxation and is free at the
point of delivery, whereas personal or social care in England and Wales
is partly funded from user charges.6 Scotland has decided
not to introduce charges for personal care or to implement care trusts,
which means that patients in Scotland and England will be treated
unequally within the NHS.
The Health Act constitutes primary care trusts as trading bodies
required to manage the risks and costs of care.7 Like other NHS trusts, their main statutory duties are financial, and they
must remain within the resource limits set them and pay a charge on
their assets. The NHS Plan has put in place a series of measures
that will enable failing trusts In the next sections I explore the cost pressures that trusts face
relating to capped budgets, drug prescribing and new technologies, and
the use of private finance and the various ways in which they might
respond to the requirement to keep within budget.8-10
The debts incurred using private finance to fund
capital investment will present an important new cost pressure. The
NHS plan predicts that by 2007 the NHS will become liable for an extra £7bn capital investment using private finance. Although NHS trusts must repay debts from their annual current expenditure, the government has not published the current or future annual revenue implications of
using private finance. The only aggregate data relate to the £319m
annual rental reimbursement scheme for primary care.
Published data for the £2bn of first wave private finance initiative
deals signed by November 2000 show that the annual availability fee and
total private finance initiative charge average 12% and 17%
respectively of the total capital investment.11 Based on these averages, the annual payments made by trusts for private finance
will increase threefold, from £654m annually for schemes signed in
November 2000, to over £2.1bn by 2007 (table 1). NHS trusts also have
to pay capital charges of £2.4bn to the Treasury on land, buildings,
and equipment owned by the NHS. By 2007, NHS trusts will have to find
£4.5bn from their annual revenue allocations to service their private
finance debts and capital charges. Since trusts are locked into private
finance initiative deals for 25-30 years, the escalating cost of
private finance will be at the expense of clinical services and patient
care unless there is a commensurate increase in
funding.11-13
Table 1.
The four potential ways in which care trusts and primary
care trusts might deal with cost pressures are listed in the box and
discussed below.
Summary points
For the first time, an NHS body will be able to charge for
personal care and hotel costs
Government guidance on intermediate care restricts entitlement to NHS
care to six weeks except in exceptional circumstances
NHS reimbursement mechanisms are being altered in ways that facilitate
a shift to personal insurance rather than social insurance and
universal coverage
By 2007, NHS trusts will have to find £4.5bn from annual revenue
allocations to service debt incurred by using private finance and
capital charges
The incentive structure of the new system will force care trusts to
find ways of constraining expenditure through rationing, user charges,
and commercial activities
If the principles of the NHS are to be upheld, the Health and Social
Care Bill must be amended to abolish charges for personal care and
prevent privatisation of clinical services and staff
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Primary care trusts and care trusts
NHS trading bodies
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Primary care trusts and...
Cost pressures related to...
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References
that is, those that do not meet their
statutory financial targets
to be taken over by private firms or by
other trusts. Currently, NHS trusts can generate income only through
fees from private patients and funds for commercial research, both of
which are restricted by capacity constraints.
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Cost pressures related to capital investment
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Primary care trusts and...
Cost pressures related to...
Strategies for dealing with...
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References
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Strategies for dealing with cost pressures
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Primary care trusts and...
Cost pressures related to...
Strategies for dealing with...
Will public-private...
Restoring public health...
References
Strategies for reducing costs
Reducing expenditure on premises
Trusts may seek to reduce expenditure on general practice
premises. Currently, many general practitioners opting into
personal medical services pilots are given a generous baseline budget
for practice premises and salary costs, which they negotiate locally.
Trusts faced with revenue shortfalls may be tempted to reduce general
medical services expenditure on non-ringfenced capital schemes. General
practitioners could face the risk of not being adequately reimbursed
for their premises, a situation they currently encounter when the
payments they make as part of a lease or finance deal exceed the
district valuer's market rent valuation. General practitioners will no
longer have the same control or ability to negotiate rental
reimbursement when trust boards are in place, and for-profit market
entrants may make generous offers to buy out general practitioners from
their share of ownership.1 This is not inconsistent with
the government's aim of making general practice into a salaried service.
Increasing income from commercial and retail outlets and sale of
health care
The procurement of new premises and health centres under
public-private partnerships relies on generating new income streams
from the provision of social services, housing, and private health
care (such as nursing and residential care homes) and from commercial
and retail outlets. Many of the new entrants into ownership of NHS
premises fund the capital investment raised under the private finance
initiative from commercial revenues.1 There are currently
no restrictions on trusts setting up business ventures, and the
government has introduced an equity arm to drive the process known as
the Local Improvement Finance Trust (LIFT).
Reducing expenditure on NHS care and increasing income from
charges
The Health and Social Care Bill allows primary care trusts
to generate non-NHS income through user charges by becoming care trusts
and holding pooled budgets for health and social care. The most obvious
area for the introduction of charges is the intermediate care sector.
This is the new care sector identified by the government to reverse the
decline in NHS capacity resulting from decades of closure of NHS beds
and services in long term care, rehabilitation, and recovery.
Maximising income by selecting patients for case mix
Cherry picking
Primary care trusts have a built-in incentive to select
patients, known in the United States as cream skimming or cherry
picking. The NHS covers all patients in the United Kingdom. However,
because general practitioners can choose their patients, trusts will
have the potential to select patients on the basis of risk either by
encouraging private health cover or by selecting lower risk groups. For
example, walk-in centres and NHS Direct provide trusts with a mechanism
for identifying high risk patients and selecting them out. Trusts in
prosperous areas will have a built-in advantage as well as the ability
to promote greater use of private insurance.
for instance, by excluding services
for mental health, learning disabilities, rehabilitation, or
intermediate care. The current blurring of the boundaries for provision and funding (table 2) makes it increasingly likely that
some care trusts will resort to selecting patients by restricting services available on the NHS.
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Risk adjusted funding or capitation
Unlike health authorities, primary care trusts are not
reimbursed on the basis of geographically defined populations but on
the basis of practice lists. This marks a fundamental shift in the
principle of resource allocation and risk pooling over geographical
populations. The change could come to be seen as a major opening for a
move to an insurance based system.
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Will public-private partnerships take us down the American way? |
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In September 2000 the Institute for Public Policy Research working group on public-private partnerships advocated transferring NHS and clinical staff to the private sector and allowing health care companies to run primary care trusts.19 Pilots are already up and running, with NHS trusts subcontracting acute and intermediate care services and pathology services to private hospitals. Clinical services under these contracts are being privatised.6
The government presents its NHS Plan and the Health and Social Care Bill as a move towards greater integration coupled with long overdue investment. The principles are to be applauded, but the reality is different. There is the spectre of US-style health maintenance organisations, to which the new structures of the NHS conform. Like health maintenance organisations, primary care trusts will increasingly operate in the market as trading bodes. Clause 4 of the Health and Social Care Bill enables the secretary of state to transfer public funds to the private sector as direct grants or loans, and it also allows the private sector to operate and run clinical and social care services on his behalf. Care trusts will be responsible not just for the risks and costs of care but also for reconciling the competing objectives of meeting the returns required by shareholders and public health needs.
As with health maintenance organisations, the reimbursement mechanisms
of care trusts are being altered in ways that facilitate a shift away
from social insurance and universal coverage to personal insurance,
user charges, and time limited care. The integration of budgets and
responsibilities for health and social care creates the mechanisms and
incentive structure for introducing charges for personal care and hotel
costs. This, combined with the recent guidance which limits NHS
intermediate care to six weeks, means that more patients are likely to
find themselves paying for elements of care that they once received
free under the NHS.
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Restoring public health principles |
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There is still time to ameliorate this policy.
Firstly, the government should reaffirm the principle of universality
by requiring that care trusts serve, and are reimbursed on the basis
of, geographical populations rather than practice lists. This will
preclude any tendency to cherry pick and minimise a drift to private
health care insurance. Secondly, the central recommendation of the
Royal Commission on Long Term Care
that personal social care be
provided free at the point of delivery and funded from general
taxation
should be implemented (as it is in Scotland). This will make
it more difficult to make care a personal responsibility and prevent
NHS care trusts from shunting costs to individuals and introducing eligibility criteria for NHS care. Thirdly, commercial activities such
as the sale of private health insurance and private health care should
be prohibited from any premise in which the NHS pays for care. This
would prevent the blurring of the boundaries for responsibility for
funding care and conflicts of interest as trusts struggle to meet their
statutory financial duties. Fourthly, the bill should remove the
statutory financial duties on trusts, including capital charges. It
should also abolish the contracting system, which drives market
behaviour. Finally, it should establish proper mechanisms for local and
parliamentary accountability to reverse the current democratic deficit.
Unless the legislation is amended along these lines, Bevan's legacy
and the principles of universality and comprehensive care upon which
the NHS was founded will be destroyed, and the Health and Social Care
Bill will indeed be the last act of the NHS.
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Acknowledgments |
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Competing interests: None declared.
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References |
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| 1. | Pollock AM, Player S, Godden S. Financing primary care. BMJ 2001;322: linked article same issue. |
| 2. | Secretary of State for Health. The NHS plan. London: Stationery Office, 2000. |
| 3. | Department of Health. The new NHS. London: Stationery Office, 1997. |
| 4. |
Majeed A, Malcolm L.
Unified budgets for primary care groups.
BMJ
1999;
318:
772-776 |
| 5. | NHS Executive. Primary care trusts. www.doh.gov.uk/pricare/pcts.htm (accessed 6 March 2001). |
| 6. |
Pollock AM.
Will intermediate care be the undoing of the NHS?
BMJ
2000;
321:
393-394 |
| 7. | House of Commons. Health and social care bill. London: Stationery Office, 2000. |
| 8. | Player S, Godden S, Pollock AM. Well-laid plans. Health Service Journal 1999 Nov 4:28-9. |
| 9. | Pollock AM. Primary care from fundholding to health
maintenance organisations? NHS Doctor and Commissioning GP
1998 Jul:6-7.
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| 10. | Pollock AM. The American way. Health Service Journal. 1998 Apr 4:28-9. |
| 11. | Department of Health. Expenditure questionnaire 2000. Memorandum to the health committee, NHS resources and activity. London: Stationery Office, 2000. |
| 12. | Department of Health. Departmental investment strategy. London: DoH, 2000. |
| 13. | Health Select Committee. Public expenditure on health and personal social services 2000. Memorandum received from the Department of Health containing replies to a written questionnaire from the committee. London: Stationery Office, 2000. |
| 14. | Trade Partners UK. Sector overview. www.tradepartners.gov.uk/healthcare/profile/index/overview.shtml (accessed 6 March 2001). |
| 15. | Department of Health. Intermediate care. London: DoH, 2001. (HSC 2001/01: LAC(2001)1.) |
| 16. | Ellis R, Pope G, Iezzoni L. Diagnosis-based risk adjustment for medical capitation payments. Health Care Financing Review 1996; 17: 101-128[Medline]. |
| 17. | Kronick RT, Dreyfus LL, Zhou Z. Diagnostic risk adjustment for Medicaid: the disability capitation payment system. Health Care Financing Review 1996; 17: 7-33[Medline]. |
| 18. | Kuttner R. Everything for sale. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999:143-144. |
| 19. | Institute for Public Policy Research Working Group On Health. PPPs in health: summary of recommendations for commission meeting on 13th September. London: IPPR, 2000. |
(Accepted 21 February 2001)
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